In modern philosophy, the concept of truth has been problematized from different
| INTRODUCTION
Truth is and has been one of the most central and extensively debated topics in philosophy. 1 Whilst philosophers are keen to understand the nature of truths and what makes them true, scholars of evidencebased health care (EHBC) however have tended to more interested in bias. A simple word search on PubMed gives about 181 000 hits for bias and just 22 000 hits for truth. Epidemiologists generally address the topic of bias by describing categories of kinds of bias and offering suggestions on how to minimize or eliminate each. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] The focus on research methodology (specifically the practicalities of experimentation) and clinical application (specifically poor reasoning in the clinical context) may go some way to explaining why bias became so important in evidence-based practice and hence why truth as a concept was largely neglected. As a result, however, the dominant discourse of bias in EBHC is inclined to wrongly normalize truth as a
given. It overlooks that the debate around truth is far from resolved and indeed remains a live topic in philosophy and the humanities.
Also, the way bias is understood in EBHC does not seem to provide sufficient argumentation against alternative facts, factoids, and post truths. Renewed concern of falsities being propagated on an unprecedented scale through social media has inspired many from outside [10] [11] [12] and within the research community 13, 14 to come up with new solutions to counter those, but these arguments tend not to address the more fundamental question: how do truths differ from
untruths (and what is the nature of the grey zone in the middle)?
Most importantly, the discourse on bias in EBHC assumes that truth is unproblematic and that, therefore, the right decisions will emerge once all sources of biases are defeated. This flawed assumption constrains thinking of what good decision-making in the clinical encounter actually entails. 15 and Power and Invention. 16 She sees bias as productive and necessary to forge facts. Drawing on her work and that of others, we set out in this paper to uncover some of the fundamental beliefs and assumptions on bias and truth that drive and constrain what we can know and do in clinical practice. We conclude that much could be achieved by turning our attention to discussing, teaching, and extending theories of truth and considering its relationship to bias in evidence-based practice.
Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers offers an alternative view in her books Sciences et Pouvoirs

| THE IDEAL LIMIT THEOREM OF TRUTH
The philosophical debate on truth spans several millennia. However, contemporary authors on the subject usually address a set of dominant views in one way or the other. [17] [18] [19] [20] 27 Further promotion of the RCT by Cochrane 29 and others in the 1970s laid the cornerstones of the EBHC movement. 30 The early evidencebased medicine (EBM) protagonists developed a hierarchy (or pyramid)
of evidence with systematic reviews on top and case studies at the bottom, 31, 32 on the basis that methodological designs at the top of this hierarchy were less prone to bias (and therefore more likely to lead scientists to the truth).
Viewed from the ideal limit concept, bias is depicted negatively as something that distorts the truth (which would otherwise be pure, universal, and attainable). Bias has been defined by EBHC scholars as "a cause of systematic error," 5 a "deviation in judgement," 33 an inability "to approximate the truth," 4 "a deviation from the truth," 3 and "the lack of internal validity or incorrect assessment of the association between an exposure and an effect in the target population in which the statistic estimated has an expectation that does not equal the true value." 16 In Sciences et Pouvoirs, she states in her introduction (Au nom de la science) that she intends to refute the traditional claim that science and interests are opposites and that science (and associated claims of objectivity and truth) can be obtained only by "purifying" science from subjective interests. On the contrary, facts become facts by attracting subjective interests: Her argument is that since facts are in the most fundamental sense built on interests, all science is (in this sense) inherently biased. Facts are never absolute but result from an interest, a bias towards a certain line of questioning.
This perspective aligns broadly with that of other feminist philosophers, notably Martha Nussbaum, who have argued that facts are invariably value-laden and, furthermore, that an actor's emotional and moral position in relation to a "fact" (reflexively surfaced and examined) strengthens rather than weakens scholarly inquiry. 40 Stengers' perspective also has some resonance with Foucault's important argument that power and knowledge are intimately related.
The quest for knowledge makes people "visible" by subjecting them to observation, quantification, and classification. Moreover, this visibility is integrated into people's own vision of themselves: "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself." 41(p202) Knowledge thus enables governance by governing people's vision and reasoning. This also implies that without discipline and without controlling people's gaze, there would be no knowledge.
In fact, Foucault insists on the productive role of power: "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes," it "represses," it "censors," it "abstracts," it "masks,"
it "conceals." In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production." 41(p194) that at any given time, scientific inquiry is both shaped and constrained by a particular collective framing of a problem and agreed empirical methods for studying it; only when this agreed approach fails to answer newly emerging questions do some scientists break away from the collective narrative and seek to establish a new paradigm. 42 At first sight, the two views on bias described above appear incommensurable. Stengers' perspectival kind of bias might get her to a particular research question and a particular RCT, but this is a different kind of bias from the biases of the clinicians who allocate the sicker patients to the active drug by peeking at the randomization code or of the researchers who decide not to publish the study after all because it produced negative findings. Yet, in several ways, Stengers' perspective teases out and challenges the assumptions that underpin the truth concept dominant in EBHC.
Firstly, in line with Stengers' critique of an alleged disinterested science, the ideal limit theory dismisses or overlooks a subjective element, such as experience, will, consciousness, agency, or indeed inter- At the same time, actions are not left to abilities and pure chance.
Means are pursued to reach certain ends. Equally, a kind of feeding back is assumed in the ideal limit theorem. There is not just the belief that average outcomes in the long run tend to their ideal limit; the ideal limit is used to make predictions for other patients and events that were not in the research study. This supposes that somehow a future limit has some kind of an impact on individual patients today. It is perhaps remarkable that patients, new treatments, even whole complex interventions already tend towards an ideal limit that will only be revealed in the long run. 17 But how could and why could this happen?
Fourthly, the ideal limit is considered to be stable over time and pointing in one direction. This is underpinned by the assumption of a deterministic world view with an eventually predictable future if only we knew all properties and conditions of the world. Current methods of measurement may be failing and human interest blocking the view, yet all events in the past, present, and future are fixed already. That reality not only conflicts with current understandings of particle physics that see only probabilities as deterministic, and the occurrence of actual events as fundamentally unpredictable. More importantly, it conflicts with the concept of human free will. 43 In a fully deterministic world, there is no place for human interests. Is reality really like that?
Stengers' notion is one that questions a fixed reality by stressing the importance of interaction and agency.
Fifthly, Stengers draws attention to framing as interests shape concepts and ultimately facts. Defining diseases, interventions, and outcomes (for example, when designing RCTs) is essentially a subjective endeavour.
A purification process is needed 49, 50 to describe the specific problem as seen in real patients in one of the many categories as defined by the medical community. The ideal limit comes with the expectation that these in one way or the other correspond to a real world. But why is that acceptable? The ideal limit may help to deny any claims of effect from a certain framing in the long run, but in itself, it does not provide any assurance that framings overlap with those in an underlying reality.
| TOWARDS A PLURALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH IN EBHC
The assumptions underlying the ideal limit theorem are largely metaphysical; they can be neither proven nor refuted empirically. The EBHC community could very well proclaim that the world is deterministic, that our framings reflect how reality is, that an understanding of inner life or mental causality is unnecessary, and that these beliefs are justified as EBHC has been so successful.
However, the ideal limit theorem does not suffice for what EBHC intended to do. 34 Yes, it provides a truth concept for large groups and frequent events (requiring a belief that similarity can be established unequivocally). But conceptually, it cannot deal with the single case scenario in the clinical encounter-the original situation for which EBHC was developed. In that context, a patient and a clinician need to overcome the so-called philosophical problem of induction, the inability to predict the future. They will have to make a risky inference;
hence, even when the premises are correct, the conclusion and outcome may not be.
As the problem of induction cannot be overcome fully, making inferences is about evasions: finding ways of reasoning to evade the problem and achieve the best prediction possible. 22 In EBHC, the dominant evasion is the frequency-type evasion. This evasion assumes we can be right in say 95% of the cases in the long run.
Obviously in the clinical encounter, this kind of reasoning is problematic: there is no frequency of a single event. It is impossible to say whether a single patient is part of the group who will benefit or part of the one that does not. Value-laden, situated activities, dealing with nonfrequent and complex challenges, need more than just the ideal limit theorem. They require "making explicit the premises and values on which each side has built its case.
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" Philosophers tend to deal with truth in general and not with single case scenarios. As clinicians, however, we deal with the latter. Accordingly, we would like to illustrate how different philosophical conceptions of truth could come in to play using the following case as an example. The case is fictional yet inspired by three actual clinical encounters that one of the authors (SW) had. 
| Case
| Analysis
To inform the decision whether or not to prescribe antibiotics, SW could look at the effectiveness of antibiotics from a Cochrane systematic review of RCTs 62 as reported in the Dutch guideline. This shows that after 7 days of antibiotics use, the symptoms had settled in 87% of the patients, compared with 82% in the placebo group.
That finding is however of little help to Ms T as she cannot have the antibiotics 100 times in parallel (in which case she should recover about 87 times if she would take antibiotics and 13 times not). She will only have antibiotics once, and there is no way to tell beforehand whether she will be part of the 87% who improve on antibiotics or the 13% who do not (similarly, 82% who recover or 18% who do not if she did not take them). Thus, the ideal limit theorem ).
In this case, SW tries to adhere broadly to the relevant guideline (as he remembers it) to make the best inference for Ms T but becomes puzzled as guidelines from two countries conflict. Both of them are based on about the same international systematic reviews and RCTs but through the guideline development process somehow ended up with very different recommendations. A constructivist concept of truth operates here. The Dutch guideline makers chose to put, 61 for instance, less emphasis on studies from before 1960 since then rheumatic fever (and other nonsuppurative complications) has become so rare, that a GP will most likely never see it. Moreover, SW has to take into account that a UK trained colleague seeing Ms T the next day has no awareness of the Dutch guidance. As a result, SW needs to align any inference on scarlet fever with UK practices. , that he sees diagnosing scarlet fever as not useful in helping the patient achieve her purpose (kind of goal-directed pragmatism) and has noticed other recommendations based on similar evidence (a kind of constructivism).
| FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we have argued that bias is in a dual, complex, necessary, and unproductive as well as a productive conjunction with truth. We contend that a shift is needed in EBHC from a narrow focus on bias based on the ideal limit concept of truth towards more extended understanding of many theories of truth based on different philosophical positions.
We realize that this kind of thinking about other truth concepts is still somewhat preliminary and more work is needed to develop a more detailed comprehension of bias and truth in EBHC. But we would argue that evidence-based practice could gain much by starting to debate, teach, and extend concepts of truth to develop a better understanding of proper inference.
It appears promising that decision theories that are based on a less deterministic view on the world seem to be able to model human decision-making, including the biases found by Kahneman and Tversky such as the conjunction fallacy (specific conditions are considered more probable than general ones). 43, 78 On the basis of these theories and assumptions, a mathematical psychology model was proposed that deciding is not about picking from a range of fully rationalized preferences, but more like making one of many vaguely defined, dynamic, interrelated thoughts superposition stable (real) by a kind of goal directness.
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Categorizing and analysing bias is still necessary to aid research that is guided by the ideal limit concept. But to advance evidencebased practice, and provide arguments in a post-truth world, we would argue that an exploration of multiple truth concepts is needed too. It would help to provide underlying theory to qualify the perceived bias, to understand how the ideal limit concept works in reality, and to further study how the different truth concepts interfere with each other. 74 Furthermore, as explicit knowledge (of varying quality) is more widely available through the internet, the role of the clinician as provider of knowledge changes. How to differentiate truths from untruths and how to make a right inference for a particular case will become more important. Future clinicians should be educated and appropriately skilled to discuss underlying theories and assumptions of truth and bias in order to reconcile the ideal limit with human interests in the clinical encounter.
